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The fact that Multinational Corporations, hereinafter referred to as MNCs, exercise a 
great deal of economic power is undisputed. They are formidable players in the world 
economy and a capable of exercising control over global trade, investment, and 
technology transfers and so on.1 As result of this economic power, MNCs are capable 
of exerting significant political leverage in both international and domestic spheres.2 
Flowing from their economic and political power, MNCs are uniquely positioned to 
affect, both positively and negatively, human rights.  
 MNCs can be defined as an enterprise that operates within more than one 
country.3 A more legal definition of MNC would be a ‘collection of corporate entities, 
each having its own juridical identity and national origin, but each in some way 
connected by a system of centralised management and control, normally exercised 
from the seat of primary ownership’.4 The growth of MNC activity in developing 
countries has given rise to the debate about their responsibility to the host countries 
and its citizens.5 MNCs have become almost as powerful, if not more so, than some of 
the countries within which they operate, therefore they are in the same position as the 
host state to potentially violate human rights.6 For this reason, MNCs must be held 
accountable for human rights violations to the same extent that states are expected to 
be accountable. It is also important that MNC activities be legally regulated in order 
to prevent such violations from occurring in the first place.  
 This thesis will focus on examining MNCs violation of human rights with 
specific reference to the environment and child labour. This paper will critique 
existing measures South Africa has adopted and implemented to prevent MNCs from 
                                                
1 David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, ‘The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations 
at International Law’ (2004) Sydney Centre Working Paper 4 933 – 1021.   
2 Ibid at 933.  
3 Muzaffar Eroglu Multinational Enterprises and Tort Liabilities: An Interdisciplinary and 
Comparative Examination (2008) MPG Books Ltd: London at 23. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ratna Kapur, ‘From Human Tragedy to Human Rights: Multinational Corporate Accountability for 
2 Ibid t 933.  
3 Muzaffar Eroglu Multinational Enterprises and Tort Liabilities: An Interdisciplinary and 
Comp rative Examination (2008) MPG Books Ltd: London a  23. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ratna Kapur, ‘From Human Tragedy to Human Rights: Multinational Corporate Accountability for 




committing such harmful practices and to hold them accountable for violating the 
aforementioned rights. This will be done by focusing in particular on MNCs operating 
in the extractive industry in South Africa. The study will consider the nature of human 
rights violations MNCs in this sector have been accused of and how, if at all, they are 
being held accountable. Lastly, this thesis will provide recommendations in respect to 
better prevention and accountability of MNCs of human rights violations.  
 
2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The activities, intentionally or unintentionally, of MNCs have often resulted in great 
violations on human rights. The specific rights often infringed by MNCs are 
environmental rights and labour rights. For example, on 3 December 1983, in Bhopal, 
India, 27 tons of toxic gas poured out of a chemical factory, resulting in a nearby 
village in the country being engulfed in a lethal poison.7 About 25 000 people died as 
a result of the leak and more than 120000 people are still suffering as a result of the 
poisonous gas. 8  The gas leak also polluted the groundwater that the villagers 
consume. This gas leak was caused Union Carbide Corporation (hereafter referred to 
as Union Carbide), the MNC that controlled the chemical factory. The executives of 
this company knew of the potentially unsafe condition, yet did not do anything to 
avert the disaster.9 This incident could have been avoided if the MNC prioritised 
safety of its employees and the environment over maximising profit. Union Carbide, 
now owned by Dow Chemical, has still not cleaned the mess and the villagers in the 
area still have no alternative to drinking the polluted groundwater.10 The aftermath of 
the disaster saw the stock price of Union Carbide rise by two United States (US) 
dollars per share. The rise in share price arose after the announcement that a $470 
million settlement between the company and the Indian government had been 
reached.11 This sum was meant to cover past, present and future liabilities relating to 
the disaster. This amount is incomparable to the amount of damage and suffering that 
                                                
7 Anniki Laine, ‘Integrated Reporting: Fostering Human Rights Accountability for Multinational 
Corporations’ (2015) 47 The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 639 – 667 at 639.  
8 Ibid.   
9 Ibid at 640. Safety systems of the factory had been deactivated for economic reasons months before 
the leak: Dominique Lapierre and Javier Moro Five Past Midnight in Bhopal (2002) Simon and 
Schuster Ltd: London.    
10 Laine op cit note 7 at 640. 
11 Ibid.  
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was caused to the Indian villagers. This agreement meant that United Carbide was 
able to avoid admitting fault in the disaster but claiming moral responsibility for it.12
 Another example of MNC activities harming the environment is the explosion 
of British Petroleum’s (hereafter referred to as BP) Deepwater Horizon oilrig in April 
2010 resulted in 170 million gallons of oil spilling into the Gulf.13 The explosion 
killed 11 people, while the resulting spill left thousands of birds, sea turtles and other 
marine mammals dead or injured six months after the spill. Long term impacts of the 
spill include ill sea creatures, decrease in fish and wildlife populations and decline in 
commercials fisheries.14 A law suit were filed against BP by the US Department of 
Justice in New Orleans Federal Court citing BP as having caused the spill due to gross 
negligence and willful misconduct.15 BP, however, rejected this argument admitting 
mere negligence and argued that others were equally responsible.16 The Federal Judge 
rejected BP’s argument and found them to be grossly negligent. BP may face a fine 
up to $18 billion.  
 Another example is MNC Thor Chemical Inc. of Great Britain operating in 
Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa being accused of poisoning workers and putting 
surrounding community at risk from mercury exposure. Mercury shipments were 
shipped from other countries and placed at their plantation located in the province.17 
During a 1989 investigation by US journalists the severity of the pollution was 
discovered. Water samples taken from the Mngeweni river showed that 1.5 millions 
parts per billion sediment to be toxic.18 This river flows into the river that supplies 
most of Durban’s drinking water. Soon after these findings were made public, three 
workers were found to be suffering from long-term mercury exposure with one of 
them dying of the effects.19 More workers got injured as result of mercury exposure 
thereafter as well.  
                                                
12 Ibid. 
13 National Wildlife Federation, ‘How does the BP Spill Impact Wildlife and Habitat?’ (2010), 
available at http://www.nwf.org/What-We-Do/Protect-Habitat/Gulf-Restoration/Oil-Spill/Effects-on-
Wildlife.aspx, accessed on 19 March 2016. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Margaret Cronin Fisk et al, ‘BP Found Grossly Negligent in 2010 Gulf of Mexico Spill’ Bloomberg 
Business 5 September 2014, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-04/bp-
found-grossly-negligent-in-2010-gulf-of-mexico-spill, accessed 19 March 2016.  
16 Ibid. 
17 University of Michigan, ‘Environmental Justice Case Studies’, available at 





Due to public pressure, the South African government, at the time, ordered 
Thor Chemicals to clean up the pollution. The company did not take the risk of 
potential threat seriously, arguing that the level of mercury had diminished or 
disappeared downstream. 20  The Department of Water Board (DWA) routinely 
sampled the water to test for the level of mercury. On one occasion the DWA had 
ordered Thor Chemicals to close down for four weeks as result of a negative result 
obtained in the water sampling.21 Soon after, however, Thor Chemicals was given a 
new license to continue its operations. Despite continuing investigations in 1994 of 
Thor Chemicals, the Department of Environmental Affairs praised the company as 
undergoing ‘sensible operations and sound work.’ 22  There has been litigation 
surrounding Thor Chemicals; after the deaths of the workers, the company was 
criminally charged by Great Britain and in 1994 a claim was filed against the 
company in a London High Court in which it was alleged that Thor Chemicals was 
negligent in allowing the transfer of defective mercury production from England to 
South Africa and that they failed to protect their workers from a preventable death.23  
The international attention, the public outcry and litigation against Thor 
Chemicals had instrumental effects on the international trade of toxic waste.24 The 
European community had agreed not to export hazardous toxic waste to 68 of its 
former colonies. In addition, the Basel Convention25 had been signed by all industrial 
nations except the US and New Zealand by 1994. Despite the treaty  not coming into 
force until the end of 1997, countries that continued to export waste to the countries 
were subject to strict requirements, for example, they must submit details on the 
composition of the wastes, the methods of recycling and the destination of residues or 
pollution from the recycling.26 Various other companies were also investigated as a 
result. Unfortunately, the only penalty imposed on Thor Chemicals was a fine of R14 
500.27  
Along with causing immense damage to the environment that results in deaths 
of human, animals and plant life, MNCs are also known to utilise child labour. Child 





24 Ibid.  
25 United Nation, ‘Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste 
and their Disposal’ (1997).  




labour is defined by the International Labour Organisation (hereafter referred to as the 
ILO) as work that deprives children of their ‘childhood, potential and their dignity 
and that is harmful to physical and mental development’.28 MNCs often employ child 
labour as a means to maximise profit in order to be more competitive and, therefore, 
successful.29 Children, generally, require less pay and are, therefore, more profitable 
for the company to employ. The sports company Nike is a MNC guilty of utilising 
child labour. Vietnam is just one of the country in which they operate in where many 
girl children are found working in their manufacturing facilities.30 Many of these 
children work seven days a week and, at least, 14 hours a day, while earning only in 
20c (US currency) per hour.31 In addition, they are subjected to poor working 
conditions: they work in dark, hot rooms in a poorly ventilated environment that 
frequently smells of glue.32 Another MNC guilty of child labour is the computer-
making computer, Apple. The company, however, admitted to the use of child labour 
and has taken steps against the practice.33 Other companies that are suspected and/or 
prosecuted for using child labour include GAP, Levi Strauss, Speedo, Coca Cola, 
Adidas and various others.34 
 It is clear that the activities of MNCs are problematic and that steps need to be 
taken to regulate it. 
 
3. OBJECTS AND PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The main question that this thesis wishes to address is how are MNCs being 
prevented from committing and being held accountable for human rights violations, 
with specific reference to environmental rights and the illegal use of child labour in 
International, African Regional and South African Law. Furthermore, if determined 
that South African Law does not adequately hold accountable for and prevent MNCs 
committing human rights violation nor held accountable where they do, this thesis 
                                                
28 International Labour Organisation, ‘What is Child Labour’ (2015), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/lang--en/index.htm, accessed on 24 March 2016.  
29 Amy Humphries and Juliette Guiot, ‘Child Labour’ (2012) Human Rights Youth Forum, available at 
https://mismun2012.wikispaces.com/file/view/Child+Labour.doc, accessed on 24 March 2016 at 5. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid at 7. 
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The research methods to be employed in the duration of this thesis will be primarily 
desktop research. This thesis will be examining and critiquing international law, 
African regional law and South African domestic law on accountability of MNCs.  
 The international law that will be looked at in this thesis include the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights35 and to what extent, if at all, it can be 
applied to MNCs and the Charter of the United Nations36 to the extent that it may be 
an enforcement mechanism. Other relevant materials include the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises37 and the UN Guiding Principles for Business and 
Human Rights.38  
As this thesis will be looking at particular human rights violations committed 
by MNCs in the form of environmental harm and child labour use, it will be 
examining and critiquing international law that specifically deals with these issues. 
 This thesis will critique international environmental law and its ability to be 
utilised against MNCs that harm the environment. The two main international 
environmental law instruments that have been developed are the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment39 and the 1992 follow-up the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development.40  
                                                
35 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (10 December 1948) 217 A III. 
Hereafter referred to as UDHR. 
36 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (1945) 1 UNTS XVI. Hereafter referred to as the UN 
Charter. 
37 OECD, ‘Guidelines For Multinational Enterprises’ (OECD) OECD Publishing, available at 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-
enterprises_9789264115415-en, accessed on 29 April 2016. Hereafter referred to as the OECD 
Guidelines.  
38 United Nations, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (2011) HR/PUB/11/04. 
Hereafter referred to as the UN Guiding Principles. 
39 United Nations, ‘Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment’ (1972), available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503, 
accessed on 29 April 2016. Hereafter referred to as the Stockholm Declaration. 
40 United Nations, ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ (1992), available at 
http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163, accessed 
on 29 April 2016. Hereafter referred to as the Rio Declaration. 
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 An important source of international law that deals specifically with the rights 
of children is the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child.41 The CRC is an 
important law that deals specifically with the rights of children including a provision 
that prohibits the use of child labour.42 Conventions and recommendations of the 
International Labour Organisation (hereafter referred to as the ILO) on child labour 
will also be examined and critiqued in this thesis. The Minimum Age43 and the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention44 will be two of the ILO Conventions that will be 
studied.   
 As this thesis is looking at MNC accountability in South Africa is it useful to 
examine the relevant African regional system on the subject. The African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights45 as well as the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child 46  will be examined. An important case of the African 
Commission that is relevant to this thesis is Social and Economic Rights Actions 
Centre and Another v Nigeria.47 This was a landmark case decided by the African 
Commission of Human and People Rights that dealt with, albeit indirectly, with 
violation of human rights by MNCs.   
 Finally, this thesis will look at the South African law that may be utilised in 
order to prevent MNCs from committing human rights violations and hold them 
accountable where they have committed such violations. The 1996 Constitution of the 
country will be the analysed with making specific reference to provisions of 
environmental protection, children and labour rights. This thesis will also briefly 
mention enforcement and accountability mechanisms found in South African delictual 
and criminal law. The Companies Act48 will also be considered in this thesis. As 
regards South African environmental law, the National Environmental Management 
Act49 is the most relevant legislation. Its provisions involving the rights and duties of 
state and non-state actors and its enforcement mechanisms will be examined and 
                                                
41 UN General Assembly, ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1989). Hereafter referred to as the 
UN Children’s Convention. 
42 Ibid, article 32. 
43 International Labour Convention,  ‘Minimum Age Convention’ (1973) C138.  
44 International Labour Organisation, ‘Worst Form of Labour Convention’ (1999) C182.  
45 Organisation of African Unity, ‘African Charter on People’s and Human Rights’ (1981). Hereafter 
referred to as the AU Charter. 
46 Organisation of African Unity, ‘African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (1990). 
Hereafter referred to as the African Children’s Charter. 
47 (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). Hereafter referred to as the SERAC case. 
48 Act 71 of 2008. 
49 Act 107 of 1998. Hereafter referred to as NEMA. 
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critiqued. This thesis will also briefly mention other South African environmental 
law.50 Relevant case law will also be discussed.  
Furthermore, the Children’s Act51, Labour Relations Act52 and the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act53 as far as they relate to the prohibition of the use of 
child labour by MNCs will also be examined and critiqued.  
 In addition to discussing the abovementioned sources of law, this thesis will 
discuss the manner in which human rights violations by MNCs are being addressed in 
South Africa in practice. This chapter will discuss human rights violations committed 
by the Extractive Industry in South Africa and how adequately South African Law has 
dealt with these violations and how they have prevented, if at all, further violations.54 
 Various books, journal articles, legal cases, and legislation and other 
references will be utilised in aid of developing this thesis and to provide an analysis of 
the various legal instruments in place to hold MNCs accountable for human rights 
violations.  
 
5. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The topic of MNC accountability has been discussed and assessed by various 
academics in the legal field all of which have given their own recommendations on 
how to adequately address this serious issue. Some of these recommendations will be 
discussed below.  
Laine promotes the use of integrated reporting, which includes reporting on 
the MNCs environmental impact, working conditions and the corporations’ financial 
performance to the government of the country in which they are operating.55 She 
argues that states should make it mandatory for MNCs operating in their countries to 
participate in the process of integrated reporting. Laine argues that Integrated 
Reporting, by providing information about how the MNCs interact with the 
                                                
50 Other South African environmental legislation that this thesis may look at is Environment 
Conservation Act 73 of 1989, hereafter referred to as ECA, and the Mineral And Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 of 2002, hereafter referred to as MPRDA.  
51 Act 38 of 2005.  
52 Act 66 of 1995. Hereafter referred to as the LRA.  
53 Act 75 of 1997. Hereafter referred to as the BCEA. 
54 SD Kamga and OO Ajoku, ‘Reflections On How To Address The Violations Of Human Rights By 
Extractive Industries In Africa: A Comparative Analysis Of Nigeria And South Africa’ (2014) 17 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 453 – 612.  
55 Laine op cit note 7 at 654.  
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environment and the communities in which the operate, will provide states will vital 
material regarding the impact of corporate activities on human rights in their countries 
and will also serve as a practical means by which states can begin to oversea such 
activities.56 
 Kapur states that human rights law can remedy any deficit there is in the law 
to ensure MNCs do not infringe upon the rights of the citizens in whose country they 
are operating by supplying a common and acceptable regime for all parties.57 Kapur 
states that the appropriate judiciary should invoke the spirit of the UDHR and refrain 
from adopting narrow definitions in the arena of human rights, so as only to hold 
states accountable for human rights violations. 58  She says that in transnational 
situations the rights of the UDHR should be broadly interpreted to accommodate 
different value systems.59 Kapur believes that international human rights law is the 
only force that can limit the power of MNCs to inflict harm in the countries in which 
they operate and that the domestic legal regimes are unable to hold MNCs 
accountable.60  
 Kinley and Tadaki have argued against the continued reliance on states in 
which the MNCs operate to hold them accountable for human rights violations. They 
argue that states, especially developing nations, are ill equipped to hold powerful 
MNCs accountable for harming the environment and for other human rights abuses, 
which are not bound by notions of territorial sovereignty.61 They argue further that the 
continued inability of countries to regulate the activities of powerful corporations in 
their countries and still relying exclusively on state responsibility is tantamount to the 
world ‘turning a blind eye to human rights abuses inflicted by the MNCs’.62 Kinley 
and Tadaki have discussed the possibility of an international legal framework to 
regulate the activities of MNCs, but do go on to say that international regulation 
should not be a substitute for state responsibility in controlling non-state actors in that 
state’s territory.63 Governments should have primary responsibility in ensuring the 
human rights protection of their citizens, MNCs should not be expected to replace 
                                                
56 Ibid at 656. 
57 Kapur op cit note 5 at 40. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid at 41.  
61 Kinley and Tadaki op cit note 1 at 1021.  
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid at 1022. 
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states in this regard. They, further, suggest that a collective effort on part of multiple 
entities, including MNCS, governments, non-government institutions (NGOS) and so 
on, is needed to make MNC activities visible and accountable under international 
human rights law.64  
 These differing opinions amongst academics highlight the difficulty in finding 
a manner in which MNCs can effectively be held accountable for human rights abuses 
in the countries in which the operate. The fact, however, that there has been debate 
about this issue emphasises the need to address the issue and to find an effective 
solution thereto. 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that the activities of MNCs may pose of threat 
to the enjoyment of human rights of the citizens in the country in which they are 
operating. Therefore, it is necessary to determine where MNCs are operating in South 
Africa, how they are being prevented from violating human rights and how they may 
be held accountable where they have been guilty of human right violations. The 
question that this thesis seeks to address is ‘what, if any, measures are there in place 
to prevent and hold accountable MNCs for human rights violations in South Africa?’ 
This thesis will also address the effectiveness of these measures and where lacking, 
will recommend manners in which MNCs can be better prevented and held 
accountable for human rights violations. This chapter has provided an outline of all 
international, African regional and South African law that will be discussed and 
analysed in this thesis.  
 Chapter two will outline, examine and critically analyse all international and 
African regional law in place to prevent MNCs from committing human rights 
violations, with specific reference to environmental rights and child labour. The 
effectiveness of the remedies provided by these laws will be analysed.  
Chapter three will outline, examine and critically analyse all the domestic law 
of South Africa that are in place to hold MNCs from committing human rights 
violations, with specific reference to the environment and child labour. The 
effectiveness of these remedies provided by these laws will be analysed.  




Chapter four will discuss how MNCs are being prohibited and held 
accountable for violation of human rights are addressed in practice in South Africa. 
This chapter will discuss specifically human rights violations in extractive industries.  
Chapter five will be the final chapter in which conclusions will be drawn and 
recommendations in respect to better prevention and accountability of MNCs of 





































This chapter will discuss the international and regional law mechanisms in place to 
ensure that states protect their citizens from the activities of MNCs, with specific 
reference to environmental rights and child labour. In addition, this chapter will 
discuss and critique a few guidelines that directly address MNC responsibility to 
guarantee their activities do not violate human rights of the citizens of the country in 
which they are operating. The aim is to discuss and critique the existing body 
international law that may be used to prevent MNCs from violating human rights, 
special attention being paid to international and regional measures relating to the 
protection of the environment and the prevention of child labour.  This discussion will 
form the basis for evaluating the measures that South Africa has taken. 
 
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
The traditional model of international law holds, firstly, that the primary rules of 
international law are addressed to states (and state officials), not non-state actors and, 
second, under the secondary rules of international law only states incur responsibility 
for breaching the primary rules of international law.65 However, this model does not 
assert that only state conduct can give rise to international law violations. For 
instance, the secondary rules of international law recognise that ‘[t]he conduct of a 
person or group of persons "may give rise to international responsibility" if the person 
or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the 
absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for 
the exercise of those elements of authority.’66 It has been argued that the conduct of a 
corporation might give rise to a violation of international law in ‘failed states’ if the 
                                                
65 Carlos Vázquez, ‘Direct v Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under International Law’ (2005) 43 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 927 – 959 at 933. 
66 Ibid; Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th 
Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 9., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).  
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state does not regulate corporate activities and as a result MNCs commits human 
rights violations.67 The state, however, will be the party to incur responsibility in such 
a case, as they did not exercise their duty to protect.68 This duty provides that provides 
states have a positive obligation in certain circumstances to prevent private actors 
such as MNCs from infringing the rights of other individuals.69 Similarly, primary 
rules do, at times, address the conduct of private actors. For example, the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination70 expressly addresses the 
permissibility of race discrimination ‘by any persons, group or organisation’.71 This 
provision clearly prohibits MNCs from discriminating against individuals on grounds 
of race. This Convention, however, does not impose a direct obligation on the MNC 
not to discriminate on grounds of race but rather imposes on states an obligation to 
prohibit such discrimination and to hold the MNC accountable where such 
discrimination has occurred.72 These do not constitute exceptions to the traditional 
model, as the state is held responsible under international law for any violations 
thereof by MNCs. If international law directly imposes obligations on MNCs, the 
MNCs will potentially be subject to enforcement mechanisms by an international 
institution, be it an international court or tribunal.73 This, as well as other manners of 
having international law directly regulate MNCs, could be beneficial because 
expecting developing nations to adequately protect their citizens from more powerful 
MNCs can be difficult, if not impossible.74 In addition, direct international regulation 
of MNC behaviour is advantageous where the mechanisms put in place by domestic 
law of countries to regulate MNC activities is found wanting.75 
As it stands under international law, MNCs are indirectly accountable for 
human rights violations through the state. Along with being able to utilise their own 
domestic law states can utilise international law in order to hold MNCs accountable 
for human rights violations.  
An important starting point in international human rights law is the UDHR. 
                                                
67 Vázquez op cit note 1 at 933.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Sheri Rosenberg, ‘Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention’ (2009) 1 Global 
Responsibility to Protect 442 – 477 at 448. 
70 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, (Sept. 28,1966) 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 218 
71 Ibid, art 2(1)(d).  
72 Vázquez op cit note 65 at 934.  
73 Ibid at 937.  
74 Kinley and Tadaki op cit note at 938. 
75 Ibid.  
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This document is part of the international bill of rights showcasing a universal model 
of the human rights that all individuals are inherently born with. The UDHR 
recognises a plethora of rights that people are entitled to: freedom and dignity,76 equal 
protection of the law,77 the right to an effective remedy,78 and the right to fair and 
public hearing to an impartial and independent tribunal79 and so on. In addition, the 
preamble of the UDHR states that ‘every individual and every organ of society is 
bound to abide by its substantive human rights provisions’. In modern times, due to 
privatisation, many countries have allocated functions that were traditionally the 
responsibility of the state to corporations.80 Therefore, it is logical that the MNCs 
entrusted to perform functions of the state should also be expected to respect human 
rights. 81  Some of the UDHR’s provisions have become part of customary 
international law (CIL) thus making it binding on all states but not on non-state 
actors.82 As will be discussed herein, there are many international instruments that 
have codified the UDHR standards, but, especially when dealing with human rights 
violations committed by MNCs, it is the primary responsibility of national 
governments to protect the human rights of their citizens.83 Therefore, where MNCs 
have committed human rights violations via their activities in a country, it is the 
state’s responsibility to ensure that there is an effective remedy available to those who 
have had their rights infringed and that they have access to a fair and public hearing 
before an independent and impartial tribunal – as is required by the UDHR.   
 The manner in which state action or inaction is enforced under international 
law is found in the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice.84 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial 
organ of the UN.85 Only states may be parties in cases before the ICJ.86 The court may 
hear all matters referred to it and may adjudicate all matters provided for in the UN 
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Charter or in other treaties and conventions that are in force.87 Furthermore, article 
32(2) of the ICJ Statute recognises that all states party to the statute may declare they 
recognise as compulsory and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the court 
in all legal disputes involving the interpretation of the treaty, any question of 
international law, existence of a violation of an international agreement and the nature 
and extent of the reparation to be made for the breach. In deciding disputes, the ICJ 
shall apply various international law including conventions, CIL, general principles 
accepted by nations and in certain cases judicial decisions and academic scholars.88 
Chapter three of the ICJ statutes outlines the procedure that must be followed in order 
to have a case heard at the ICJ. While MNCs cannot be brought before the ICJ where 
they have committed human rights violations, states that have failed or neglected to 
protect their citizens and environment from MNC activity and/or have failed to hold 
MNC accountable where required may be brought before the court as was the case in 
a matter between Argentina v Uruguay, which will be discussed briefly below.  
As a result of the increasing power of MNCs the international community has 
developed soft law, that is a written instrument (other than a treaty) that expresses a 
preference and not an obligation that a state or non-state actor should act (or refrain 
from acting) in a specified manner,89 that directly address human rights violations in 
the form guiding principles for business that attempts to enable them to operate in a 
manner that does not infringe human rights. One of such principles is the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. These UN Guiding 
Principles recognises states’ ‘existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’ as well as the role of MNCs as specialised organs 
of society performing functions and that they are required to comply with all 
applicable laws and to respect human rights.90 These principles, further, recognises 
that appropriate and effective remedies must be made available where breached. The 
Guiding Principles applies to both states and MNCs. However, the principles does not 
create new international law obligations – neither does it undermine any obligations 
that a state may have undertaken under international law with regard to human 
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 These Principles go on to say that states should take additional steps to protect 
their citizens against human rights abuses by MNCs and other business enterprises 
since it is a foregone conclusion that states are the primary duty-bearers under 
international human rights law. States should exercise oversight over the activities of 
MNCs in order to meet their international human rights duties.92 The Guiding 
Principles also lists some of the important responsibilities that corporations have. It is 
stated that businesses should respect human rights – they should avoid violations and 
should address any impact on human rights in which they are involved.93 This 
responsibility refers to internationally recognised human rights – as expressed in the 
international Bill of Rights (UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR) and the fundamental rights 
set out in the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.94 
MNCs should have policies in place in order to prevent human rights abuses, these 
include, a policy committed to meeting these responsibilities, a human rights due 
diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for their impacts of human 
rights.95 The principles further state, that where business enterprises have identified 
that they have adversely affected human rights, they must institute a process of 
remediation through legitimate processes. 96  MNCs should, in whatever context, 
undertake to respect international human rights law and comply with all applicable all 
wherever they operate.97 While these Guiding Principles are commendable in that it 
brings attention to the international stage that adverse effects that MNCs may have on 
the enjoyment of human rights, the Principles do not create binding obligations on 
MNCs, therefore, are unlikely to bring about any significant change.  
 In addition to the UN Guiding Principles, there is the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s Guidelines for Multinational 
Corporations. The OECD is an international forum where democratic countries 
address work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges 
of globalisation. These principles assert that MNCs should respect human rights and 
contribute to economic, social and environmental progress with a goal to achieve 
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sustainable development.98  These principles also state that enterprises/ MNCs should 
contribute to the abolition of child labour echoing the ILO Declaration to be discussed 
below.99 The OECD has set out implementation procedures; countries that adhere to 
these principles are encouraged to set up National Contact Points (NCP) in order to 
undertake promotional activities, handling enquiries for discussion with parties 
concerned in any matter that covered by the Guidelines.100 Their role is to promote the 
effectiveness of these Guidelines. The NCP must operate in a visible, accessible, 
transparent and accountable manner.101 The NCP shall resolve issues that arise 
relating to these guidelines in a timely and efficient manner and in accordance with 
applicable law. 102  The NCP shall meet annually and report to the Investment 
Committee. This committee will meet periodically to discuss matters covered by the 
Guidelines. The Committee will assist the NCPs in carrying out their functions, if 
needed. It will consider reports of the NCP, assist with clarification in interpretation 
of the Guidelines and make recommendations where necessary to improve the 
functioning of the NCPs and the effective implementation of the Guidelines.103 As is 
the case with the UN Guiding Principles, these OECD Guidelines are not are legally 
binding on MNCs. Furthermore, these OECD guidelines are not binding on most 
countries as the current number of states that are members, thus adherents, of the 
OECD and its Guidelines are 30 – none of which is South Africa.104 States, however, 
who do adhere to two abovementioned principles may utilise them in order to regulate 
the activities of MNCs, to ensure they respect the protection and enjoyment of human 
rights of the citizens of the country’s in which they operate and to hold them 
accountable where they are guilty of infringing human rights.  
 The fact that MNCs are not recognised as subjects of international law is 
problematic because if they were, it is argued, that developing countries would more 
easily be able to obtain justice against them where MNCs have violated human rights 
within their country.105 It has also been argued that if there have been cases where 
chartered companies, insurgents and belligerents have recognised as subjects under 
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international law, then it is possible that MNCs can be recognised as such as well.106  
 The Statute of the International Criminal Court107 states, at article 25, that the 
court ‘shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this statute.’ The term 
natural persons clearly exclude entities with legal personality, such as MNCs. The 
reason behind this is because it is impossible to attach the proof of mens rea (fault) on 
corporations. 108  It can therefore be concluded that despite the fact that the 
international community recognises that human rights abuses by MNCs need to be 
addressed, international law does not address the issue comprehensively. There is also 
a lack of proper enforcement mechanisms for human rights abuses committed by 
private actors, which proves to be a massive impediment for people seeking relief 
under international law.  
 
2.1. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
The two international environmental declarations that will be looked at in this section 
are the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. While these Declarations do 
form part of international soft law, many of the provisions in these Declarations are 
considered CIL, and therefore binding on all states. Such provisions will be noted in 
this section as such. The Stockholm Declaration was an attempt at creating a basic 
common outlook on how to address the challenge of protecting and advancing the 
environment. 109  The Stockholm Declaration encompasses generally broad 
environmental policy goals and objectives rather than detailed normative positions.110 
Since the formation of the Stockholm Declaration international awareness of the 
challenges facing the environment has increased significantly, therefore, the 
international law on the issue has needed to develop. The Rio Declaration had the task 
of reaffirming existing normative expectations regarding the environment.  
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 These two Declarations reflect primarily the well-known international concept 
of duty to protect. The most significant provision, common to both Declarations, 
relates to the prevention of environmental harm. The Declarations establishes the 
responsibility of states to ensure that activities of their own or of which they have 
control do no cause damage to the environment of other states or to areas beyond its 
national jurisdiction.111 This provision is considered as part of CIL, thus binding on 
all nations, as was confirmed by the ICJ in its advisory opinion in the Legality of the 
Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons112 and in the Case concerning Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay.113 In Pulp Mills, two companies, one Spanish and the other Finnish, 
obtained permission from the Uruguayan government to build pulp mills on the 
Uruguayan river, which is shared by Argentina and Uruguay and is protected by a 
treaty between the two countries.114 The dispute was whether Uruguay had required 
permission from Argentina in terms of the treaty to give such permission to the two 
companies. There was a likelihood of pollution of the river resulting from the 
activities of the two companies and the existing treaty required each country to ensure 
prevention of such pollution.115 The ICJ in Pulp Mills held that the states obligation of 
prevention has its origins in due diligence, which forms part of the duty to protect. 116  
All states have the obligation to not knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other states.117 A State is thus obliged to use all the means at 
its disposal in order to avoid and prevent activities, which take place in its territory, or 
in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of 
another State.118 Since MNCs have to abide the laws of the countries in which they 
operate, the states should ensure that MNCs operating within their countries are 
abiding these principles, and where they fail the states may be referred to the ICJ 
since these principles are binding in nature in that they form part of CIL.  
 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration provides that in ‘order to protect the 
environment, the precautionary approach must be applied by states according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
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scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ There is controversy about whether 
this provision has CIL status, but in 2011 the Seabed Chamber of the International 
Tribunal of the Law of the Sea notes that there is a trend towards this approach being 
part of CIL.119  
 The Rio Declaration calls upon states to assess, inform and consult with 
potentially affected other states, whenever there is a risk of harmful effects on its 
environment.120 These requirements of the Rio Declaration have reached CIL status as 
supported by international practice.121 The Stockholm Declaration does not include a 
similar provision. 
 Both Declarations’ call for further development of the law relating to 
environmental liability and compensation.122 Most states address the damage to the 
environment using private-law regimes, such as using the law of delict, and, mostly, 
not considering the accountability of the state. 123  Recent developments in 
international environmental law, however, may provide a basic foundation for issues 
relating to environmental liability. These include, the work of the International Law 
Commission’s draft Principle on Allocation of Loss in the Case of Trans-boundary 
Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities and UNEP’s 2010 Guidelines for the 
Development of Domestic Legislation on Liability, Response Action and 
Compensation For Damage Caused by Activities Dangerous to the Environment.124 
While the international community has made significant progress in the field of 
international environmental law, the primary responsibility under international law to 
hold accountable MNCs for environmental harm is that of the state. The States are 
provided a foundation upon which to develop their own laws in order to ensure that 
activities within the own territory do not harm the environment of another state. They 
are required under CIL to ensure that they hold accountable those responsible under 
their national law.   
                                                
119 Handl op cit note 109 at 5.  
120 Ibid. Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration calls for an environmental impact assessment (EIA), 
principle 18 required emergency notifications and principle 19 calls for routine notification and 
consultation. 
121 Ibid at 6. One such practice was the International Law Commission’s draft articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities.  
122 Stockholm Declaration, principle 22 refers to international law only; Rio Declaration, principle 13 
refers to both international and national law. 





3.1. CHILD LABOUR 
 
There is a significant amount of international law that deals specifically with rights of 
children which includes the right of children not to be forced into child labour. This 
section will now discuss such law.  
 One of the most important international treaties pertaining to the rights of 
children specifically is the Convention on the Rights of the Child.125 Article 32 
prohibits the use of child labour. The provision reads as follows: 
 
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic 
exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to 
interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical, 
mental, spiritual, moral or social development. 
2. States Parties shall take legislative, administrative, social and educational measures 
to ensure the implementation of the present article. To this end, and having regard to 
the relevant provisions of other international instruments, States Parties shall in 
particular: 
(a) Provide for a minimum age or minimum ages for admission to employment; 
(b) Provide for appropriate regulation of the hours and conditions of employment; 
(c) Provide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the effective 
enforcement of the present article. 
 
 
The CRC, as with all international treaties enforcement mechanisms apply to states 
only. However, states that have MNCs operating within their countries may use the 
CRC to inform their own laws with regard to child labour. States are required to do so 
as art 32(2) states that parties must take legislative and other means in order to 
implement and give effect to article 32. State parties are also required to provide 
appropriate remedies and penalties to ensure effective enforcement. If MNCs are 
guilty of child labour and the state party, who is a signatory to the CRC, does not do 
anything to prevent such violation then the state party will be held accountable. A 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (hereafter the committee), which is established 
by article 43 of the CRC, is responsible for the implementation of the CRC.  State 
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parties are required to submit reports to the committee on measures they have taken to 
implement and enforce the CRC.126 These reports are to be made public.127 The 
Committee submits reports to the General Assembly. The Committee is entitled to 
make recommendations to the State Parties, which is to be reported to the General 
Assembly.128 Therefore, if state parties are not taking measures to prevent MNCs 
from exploiting children economically, as it required by article 32, the state party may 
be held accountable.  
 In addition to the CRC, the ILO has adopted further measures to assist states 
in protecting their children from child labour. The ILO is a tripartite UN Agency that 
brings together governments, employers and workers representatives from 187 
member states in order to set labour standards, develop policies, and devise 
programmes promoting decent work for men and women. 129  Two conventions 
important to discuss for the purposes of this thesis is the Convention Concerning the 
Minimum Age for Admission to Employment130 and the Convention Concerning the 
Prohibition and the Immediate Action for the Elimination of Worst Form of Child 
Labour.131  
The Minimum Age Convention states that all member states must design a 
national policy for the purposes of abolishing child labour and to raise the 
employment age to a level consistent with the fullest mental and physical 
development of young persons.132 Article 3(1) of the Convention states that the 
minimum age for employment, which is by nature likely to cause health, safety and 
morals of young children to be jeopardised, shall not be less than 18 years. Younger 
children are permitted to work in ‘light-work’ that is not likely to be harmful to their 
heath or development and will not prejudice their school attendance and participation 
in extra-mural school activities. 133  Appropriate penalties and other necessary 
measures must be taken by a competent authority to ensure the effective enforcement 
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of the Minimum Age Convention’s provisions.134 States are required to submit reports 
to the independent Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (hereafter the ILO Committee).135 The ILO Committee examines 
the compliance of the member states to the Convention. The ILO Committee may ask 
for more information from the states should the member states reports lack clarity or 
are incomplete. The Committee will report to the ILO Conference Committee on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (hereafter Conference Committee) 
– who will then hear selected cases.136 The Constitution of the ILO137 provides for 
inter-state complaints.138 These complaints are examined by Governing Body and 
communicated to the government in question.  The matter may be settled, or a 
Commission of Inquiry (hereafter COI) may be appointed to consider the matter.139 
The COI calls witnesses, examines documentation and makes unannounced visits to 
the member state.140 The COI, thereafter, writes a report containing its conclusions 
and recommendations and whether or not they intend referring the complaint to the 
International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ).141   
 The Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention shares a similar article 1 and 10 
with the Minimum Age Convention as mentioned above. The enforcement 
mechanisms of this Convention are the same as explained above with regards to the 
Minimum Age Convention. The term ‘worst forms of child labour’ consists of: 
(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of 
children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced 
or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; 
(b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of 
pornography or for pornographic performances; 
(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the 
production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties; 
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(d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to 
harm the health, safety or morals of children.142  
Article 5 of the Convention states that each member state must, after consultation 
with employer and worker organisations, must establish an appropriate mechanism to 
monitor the implementation the provisions giving effect to this Convention. 
Therefore, where MNCs are operating in the member’s country, the state has so 
ensure that the MNCs are not employing children in a manner that contravenes the 
Worst Form Convention. MNCs will also have a hand in the monitoring mechanisms 
since states have to implement such mechanisms after consultation with employers’ 
organisations. Effective measures to ensure implementations and enforcement of the 
provisions of this Convention, including penal and other forms of sanctions, must be 
taken by member states.143 A state who has ratified this Convention, is therefore 
bound to ensure the implementation hereof, and to ensure that MNCs are held 
accountable by means of sanctions where they have employed child labour in a 
manner inconsistent with article 3 of this Convention. Where states have failed in this 
obligation, they may be held accountable in the manner described above and my face 
a referral to the ICJ.  
 All the above-mechanisms place in international law place the primary 
responsibility on states to ensure that MNCs are not employing children in a manner 
inconsistent with international law. The measures that may be taken by the respective 
international organisations may only be taken against the states that are members of 
the ILO and that have ratified the Conventions. The threat of referral to the ICJ may 
give incentive to states to effectively implement the aforementioned conventions by 
developing mechanisms within their domestic laws to ensure MNCs are not 
employing child labour, however, since the Conventions do not create binding rights 
and obilgations on MNCs – the ILO and ICJ may not hold MNCs directly accountable 
where they have violated the rights of children in this manner.       
                                  
 
                                                                     
                                                
142 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, art 3.  
143 Ibid, art 7(1).  
  
28 
3. AFRICAN REGIONAL LAW  
 
African regional law, much like international law, does not hold MNCs directly 
accountable for human rights violations committed in the country within which they 
operate. Although, certain provisions of Conventions developed within this regional 
system can directly impose obligations on a corporation but the state will be held 
accountable where MNCs have failed to abide these obligations. This system, too, has 
mechanisms in place ensure that states develop their law in order to ensure that the 
human rights of their citizens are protected from anyone, including MNCs; in addition 
there are means in place to hold the state accountable where they have failed in their 
duties.  
 The African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights144 was enacted before the 
rise of MNC activity within the African region and therefore does not address the 
responsibilities of MNCs regarding human rights violations. However, it does place 
the responsibility on the African states to protect the various human rights of their 
citizens while taking into account human rights issues that is specific to the African 
region and bringing mechanisms of accountability closer to the effected people.145 
The Charter provides various mechanisms by which to hold states accountable where 
they have failed to abide the provisions thereof. These provisions include the right to 
a satisfactory environment,146 the right to have their case heard, including the right to 
appeal in order to have hid or her fundamental rights recognised and protected,147 and 
the right to work under equitable and satisfactory condition. 148 The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Right (African Commission) is established by 
article 30 of the Charter in order to promote human and People’s Rights and ensure 
their protection in Africa. The African Commission may resort to any appropriate 
investigation method when organisations, states and persons bring issues to their 
attention.149 States (who are party to the Charter) may communicate to the African 
Commission if they have good reason to believe that another state (who is party to 
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this Charter) has violated a provision of the African Charter,150 after having first 
notified and sought solution from the alleged infringing state and received no 
satisfactory response.151 However, a state may refer an issue directly to the African 
Commission in terms of article 49. All local remedies, if exist, ought to have been 
exhausted before the Commission will deal with the matter unless clear to the 
Commission that the procedure of achieving these local remedies would be unduly 
prolonged.152 The Commission may ask states for all relevant information and states 
may be represented before the commission and submit written or oral 
representations.153 In terms of article 52, the Commission must prepare a report 
stating the facts and its findings. The report must be communicated all parties 
involved, including the Assembly of Head of States and Government. The 
commission may make recommendations, as it deems necessary and useful.154 The 
Commission may also receive communication regarding alleged violation of the 
African Charter by a State party from parties other than a state, including Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs).155 All measures taken in terms provisions of 
the Charter are to remain confidential until such time as the Assembly decides 
otherwise.156 This provision is problematic since publicity is a massive tool that can 
be utilised to prevent further human rights violations and is also a strong measure of 
accountability.157 The effect of publicity is a significant one as it brings out the 
resultant shame, which may serve as a deterrent for future human rights violations.158  
 Each state is also required to submit a report every two years on the legislative 
or other measures they have taken in order to give effect to the rights and freedoms 
recognised by the Charter.159 The procedure in bringing a matter to the African 
Commission can be quite a lengthy procedure and by the time the commission can 
eventually hear a matter the damage done may be irreversible.160  
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 An important case heard by African Commission which held a state 
accountable for failing in its duty to protect its citizens from human rights violations 
committed by an MNC operating in their country is Social and Economic Rights 
Actions Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria.161 SERAC and the Centre for 
Economic and Social Rights (CESC) communicated to the African Commission that 
the military government of Nigeria had been directly involved with oil production of 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) and Shell Petroleum 
Development Corporation (Shell), whose activities had caused severe environmental 
degradation including contamination of the environment which resulted in health 
problems of the Ogoni people, who inhabited the area (Ogoniland).162 It was alleged 
that NNPC and Shell had exploited oil reserves in Ogoniland with no regard for the 
health of the people or environment. They disposed toxic waste into the environment 
in violation of international environmental standards. The MNC and state company 
failed to maintain its facilities causing several avoidable oil spills in very close 
proximity with the villages.163 The spills resulted in the contamination of the water, 
air and soil and caused serious long and short-term health impacts – including skin 
infections, respiratory ailments, cancer and reproductive problems.164 It was argued 
that the Nigerian government condoned and assisted in the MNCs violations by 
placing legal and military powers of the state at the disposal of the oil companies.165 
In addition, the government has not monitored the MNCs nor have they insisted on 
safety measures that are standard procedure within the oil industry thus failing in its 
duty to protect. Furthermore, information regarding the activities of the MNC was 
withheld from the effected people and no opportunity was given to the local 
community to consult with the MNC before beginning the operations.166 The Ogoni 
community attempt to non-violently protest the actions of the MNCs / Shell were 
quashed by the military by means of their homes and villages being destroyed and 
having their food source threatened.167 In their actions, it was argued that the Nigerian 
government had violated several provisions of the African Charter.168 The African 
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Commission held that Nigeria had infringed the Charter and have appealed to the 
government to protect the environment, health and livelihood of the Ogoniland people 
by conducting investigations and prosecuting all organisations involved in human 
rights violations of the Ogoni people, including Shell, ensuring adequate 
compensation for the victims, undertaking a comprehensive clean-up and restoration 
of the environment, enabling environmental and social impact mechanisms and by 
providing information on health and environmental risks and meaningful access to 
regulatory and decision-making bodies to communities likely affected by the oil 
operations.169 While this judgment is to be commended for it incentivises states to put 
mechanisms in place to ensure MNCs do not violate human rights as well as to ensure 
accountability of the corporation where they are guilty of violating human rights, the 
African Commission was not able to directly hold accountable the MNC for its 
violations. This case displays the manner in which a state facilitated the human rights 
violations of an MNC. In cases where the MNC is more powerful than the state in 
question, it might be difficult for such state to prevent MNCs from violating the 
environment in order to maximise their profits. 
 There might be a benefit of enabling the African Commission to directly hold 
the MNC accountable in order to act as a deterrent for future human rights violations 
or creating a separate commission in order to hold accountable MNCs from violating 
human rights.  
 In addition to having the African Commission being able to adjudicate issues 
relating to infringement of the African Charter, there has also been the establishment 
of an African Court on Peoples’ and Human Rights.170 Article 34(6) of the Protocol 
requires a state party to sign a declaration accepting the competence of the court 
before a person or an NGO can approach the court. To this date, only six African 
countries have signed such a declaration.171 There has not been much success at the 
African court. The court has suffered from financial difficulties, lack of resources and 
from judgments not being properly enforced.172  
                                                
169 Ibid. 
170 African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Establishment 
of African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1998), available at 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/court-establishment/, accessed on 1 June 2016.  
171 These countries are Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Ghana and Tanzania. 
172 Carolyn Scanlon Martorana ‘The New African Union: Will it Promote Enforcement of the 
Decisions of the African Court of Human & Peoples’ Rights?’ (2008) 2 George Washington 






This chapter has demonstrated the nature in which international and regional law can 
be utilised to prohibit MNCs from violating human rights in the countries in which 
they operate.  
 While international and regional law do not directly hold MNCs accountable 
for human rights violations they do, at times, attempt to directly impose obligations 
on them but would hold the state accountable where MNCs have acted in 
contravention of such Conventions. States are held accountable on the basis that they 
have failed to adequately protect their citizens from the activities of MNCs. As shown 
in the Pulp Mills heard by the ICJ and SERAC case by the African Commission states 
will be held accountable for where they have failed to take measures to prevent 
human rights violations and environmental degradation perpetrated by an MNC 
within their territory.  
 Criticisms of these laws and the enforcement mechanisms that come with it 
are that MNCs lack direct accountability to an international institution. Many of the 
states in which the MNCs operate are developing countries and are frequently less 
powerful than the MNCs operating within their country and therefore might have it 
difficult to regulate the activities of MNCs and hold them accountable where required. 
In addition, domestic law in place to protect their citizens from human rights 
violations by MNCs might not be an adequate for various reasons. Having an 
international institution such as a court or tribunal to directly hold MNCs accountable 
might assist states unable or unwilling to do so themselves and might motivate the 
MNCs to ensure that its activities do not harm the citizens of the country in which 
they are operating. 
 Furthermore with regards to African regional law, the procedure to take cases 
to the African Commission is such a lengthy one that by the time the matters final 
gets to the Commission the damage done by the MNC and the relevant state for not 
taking measures to regulate the MNC’s activities might be beyond repair. 
Furthermore, the African court established has not seen much success either for 









This chapter will outline, discuss and critique all laws that may be used to prevent 
MNCs from committing human rights violations and to hold them accountable where 
they are guilty of committing human rights violations.  
 South Africa has demonstrated a commitment to protection of human rights 
through the enactment of the 1996 Constitution and various Acts of Parliament 
enacted to give effect to these Constitutional rights. These Constitutional provisions 
and legislation include specific laws that prohibit child labour and protect the 
environment and provide mechanisms to ensure accountability of anyone who 
violates these laws. South African company law may also play a role in ensuring 
MNCs do not  
MNCs operating in South Africa have the legal obligations to abide the laws of the 
country including laws that prohibit child labour and prohibit degradation of the 
South African environment. Any violation of such laws leaves the MNCs open to 
various sanctions under South African laws.  
 This chapter will discuss the applicability of the the South African Bill of 
Rights to corporations, the possibility of corporations being held criminally liable for 
serious human rights violations, and specific prohibiting child labour and protecting 
the environment.  
 
2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING MNCS OPERATING IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
2.1. The South African Constitution 
 
The Constitution is the most supreme law of South Africa and any law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid.173 In addition to applying to all law and binding all 
organs of state, the Constitution binds all natural and juristic persons (including 
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companies) ‘if, and to the extent that, it is applicable taking into account the nature of 
the right and the nature of the duty imposed by the right’.174  
The Constitutional Court, when interpreting this provision, had regard for the 
intensity of the constitutional right in question.175 The meaning of the phrase appears 
to have something to do with the scope of the right. For s 8(2) to be applicable the 
person alleging a Bill of Rights violation must be expressly identified as bearers of 
the constitutional right as well as the potential for the specified right to be invaded by 
someone other than the state.176 Therefore, in certain cases the Constitution is directly 
applicable where MNCs operating in South Africa have violated a constitutional right 
of South African citizens. In addition, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights establish 
a normative value system that must be respected whenever the common law or 
legislation in being interpreted.177 This is termed indirect application. In this scenario, 
the Constitution does not override ordinary law or generate its own remedies, but 
rather demands furtherance of its values mediated through the operation of ordinary 
law.178 The indirect form of application of Bill of Rights, especially where litigation is 
between private actors, is the preferred form for various reasons, one of which being, 
the principle of avoidance, which provides that constitutional issues should be 
avoided, where possible. 179  Another reason constitutional remedies are not as 
appropriate or flexible as common-law remedies would be.180 So, therefore, where 
ordinary law is considered with regards to whether a MNC has infringed the human 
rights of those living in South Africa, the Constitution would apply, either directly or 
indirectly.  
One of the rights contained in the Constitution includes the right freedom and 
security of the person181 – meaning that companies must take steps to ensure that the 
working environment of its employees does not violate this right. In a Constitutional 
Court case an applicant, a miner, had contracted tuberculosis and chronic obstructed 
airways due to his exposure to harmful substances during his employment.182 is a 
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right that is worded as protection from either public or private source.183 The court’s 
analysis of s 12 in this matter, however, amounted to a protection from the legislature 
(public source) as opposed to protection from the company (the private source). This 
analysis would constitute a hurdle in the development of human rights (constitutional) 
litigation against companies since this development is dependent upon the progress of 
horizontal application of the Constitution on MNCs.184 While the claim was based on 
a delict – it is significant in the effect that it has against a company. The court gave 
leave to the applicant to pursue the matter. A more direct approach that could have 
succeeded would have been to challenge the matter as a violation of the right to health 
or even the right to an environment that is not harmful to health and wellbeing.185 
This could have challenged just how far the courts were willing to go in recognition 
of the human rights responsibilities of companies.186   
 Another important right that can be used to challenge the activities of MNCs is 
South Africa, albeit indirectly, is the right to just administrative action.187 This is 
illustrated in the case of The Director: Mineral Development Gauteng Region and 
Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Save the Vaal Environment and Others. 188  This case 
concerned an application of the audi alteram partem  (hear the other side) rule in the 
granting of a mining licence. The court held because the Constitution included 
environmental rights as fundamental justiciable human rights, the necessary 
implication requires that environmental considerations be accorded appropriate 
recognised and respect in the administrative process.189 It was found, amongst other 
reasons, that since the operations of Sasol could potentially destroy the Rietspruit 
Wetland, threaten flora and fauna, cause severe air, noise and water pollution, and 
decrease the value of the properties of the people living in the affected area the audi 
alteram partem rule applied in this matter and that interested parties ought to have 
been notified of the company’s application for a mining licence and they should have 
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been given an opportunity to be heard.190 NGO and any other interested parties 
(which is a broad range of people as result of section 38191 of the Constitution) may 
challenge a decision of a government authority to grant MNCs various operational 
licences that have the potential to damage the environment and/or decrease their 
enjoyment to the environment under administrative law. The court held that such 
decisions are one of an administrative nature and are therefore subject to judicial 
review should administrative process192 not have been adequately followed.  
 The various people that will be affected by the activities of MNCS in South 
Africa are not in the best position to have their issues heard in a court of law. While 
the Constitution guarantees everyone the right to justice not everyone has easy access 
to justice.193 The litigation process is one that is extremely costly thus its only wealthy 
South Africans that have this access to justice. While there are various organisations 
such as Legal Aid South Africa that do provide free access to legal services this is not 
always an option for all South Africans and also because of such a heavy backlog of 
cases that such organisations are embattled with it they are not always able to assist 
with all matters or simply do not have the resources to ‘take on’ a wealthy MNC at 
court. This would mean that indigent people suffering at the hands on MNCs lack 
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2.2. South African Company Law 
 
The South African Companies Act195 has taken significant steps towards mainstream 
human rights. One of the purposes of the Companies Act is to ‘promote the 
compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided for in the Constitution, in the 
application of company law’.196 Previously, company and constitutional law were 
seen as separate disciplines with a limited scope for overlap but now the reference to 
the Constitution in the Act means that one needs to refer to the Constitution when 
considering the Companies Act.197 Section 7 of the Companies Act dismisses the idea 
that only states and individuals are bound by constitutional obligations 198 
Corporations operating in South Africa are also bound by the Constitution.  
One of the many functions of the Companies Act regulates the duties of 
directors. Section 73(3)(b) of the Act provides that the directors must act in the best 
interests of the company. The Companies Act does not define the term ‘best interests’. 
At common law, the directors owe their duties to the shareholders as a collective.199 
Furthermore, in South African Fabrics v Millman200 that court held that the term 
interests in this context are only those of the company and its members.201 The 
Constitution and section 7 of the Companies Act brings into question whether the 
courts interpretation of the term ‘best interests’ is still applicable today. In addition, s 
158 of the Companies Act202 would imply that the position ought to be developed to 
be more in line with the Bill of Rights. Companies are now situated within a 
constitutional framework; therefore, it is argued that the position expressed in the 
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Millman case no longer reflects the true position of the law.203 The position, therefore, 
should be that when the directors are acting in the best interests of the company they 
should give consideration to the values of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.204 
The Companies Act does not fundamentally change the nature of the company but 
simply reinforces the idea that companies, as well as the state and individuals, must 
act in accordance with the Constitution. In Bester v Wright205, it was held that if a 
director does not act in accordance with the Companies Act and any other applicable 
law, that he or she would be in breach of their fiduciary duties.206 Therefore, should a 
director disregard the Bill of Rights then he will be in violation of his fiduciary duties. 
Should a director of company be guilty of breaching a fiduciary he or she may 
be held personally liable for any loss sustained by the company in terms of s 77 of the 
Company’s Act. Therefore, a director of an MNC may be held accountable if he 
breaches his or her fiduciary duties which it has been argued above should include 
instances we such director has acted contrary to the Constitution.  
Due to s 8 of the Constitution (mentioned above), creating juristic persons that 
can pursue maximisation of profit at the expense of human rights is legally 
impossible. 207  Under the Constitution a company can no longer claim that its 
adherence to human rights norms is voluntary. The exercise of corporate power is 
permitted only to the extent that it does not violate the Bill of Rights.208  
 
2.3. Criminal Liability Of Corporations  
 
The crime committed by corporations has increased over the years – these include 
health and safety regulation violations, environmental degradation and child labour. 
Corporate responsibility, in the domestic sphere, can be regulated by civil law redress 
as well as criminal sanctions.209 In the more serious cases of wrongdoing on the part 
of the corporation, civil law redress may not be sufficient to address the wrong 
committed. The severe sanctions offered by criminal law would be a big step forward 
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in changing patterns of behaviour of corporations.210 There are a few theories of 
corporate criminal liability.  One of these theories is one of vicarious liability, which 
imputes the conduct of the corporation to the corporation itself. 211 The South African 
Criminal Procedure Act212 imputes the conduct of the director or employee to the 
corporation, but extends responsibility beyond the normal rules of vicarious liability 
by including liability of the corporation for the conduct of the employee not only 
acting in the course and scope of his employment, but also ‘furthering of 
endeavouring to further the interests of the corporation.’  
Another theory of criminal corporate liability is the principle of aggregation 
where a conviction is based on the derivative, but collective, responsibility 
determined by the aggregation of conduct and states of mind within the 
corporation.213 This principle is based on the principle of collective responsibility.214 
This theory was applied in the US case of United States v Bank of New England.215 
The court accepted the concept of collective knowledge in the context of criminal 
corporate liability in the basis that corporations compartmentalise knowledge – by 
subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations into smaller components. 
The aggregate of those components constitutes the knowledge of the corporation of a 
particular operation.216  
The organisational model of liability that determines fault by examining 
the institutional practices and corporate policies of the institution is another theory of 
corporate criminal liability.217 Under this model, a negligent omission to prevent harm 
or to guard against the risk of occurrence, rather than a positive action, is made 
punishable.218  
 Traditionally, criminal law emphasises human fault rather than 
corporate fault. It was argued that since corporations lacked ‘a body to be kicked’ or a 
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‘soul to be damned’ they are unable to be convicted of criminal offences.219 Many 
countries, however, have developed their law in this regard and, therefore, do not 
adhere to this anymore. South Africa imputes criminal liability on corporations in 
terms of s 332(1) of the CPA, as mentioned above. In terms of this section, where a 
corporation is charged with a fault-based crime the fault of the director or employee 
who committed the crime will be imputed to the corporation.220 In R v Bennett Co 
(Pty) Ltd221, decided on a similarly worded s 332(1), the negligence of an employee 
was imputed to the company, resulting in the conviction of the company for culpable 
homicide.  
Criminal corporate liability extends to crimes based on intention, negligence 
and strict liability. This was emphasised in Ex Parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v 
Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie.222 This judgment affirms that fault in the form of 
intention or negligence is required on the apart of someone in the company.  
As regards sentencing, it is suggested, rather conservatively by many, that the 
most appropriate sanction for corporations who have been guilty of committing 
crimes is the fine, especially since corporations cannot be imprisoned.223 However, it 
has been argued there is a far wider range of possible sanctions that may be imposed 
upon the convicted corporation. For example, publicity as a court-ordered sanction 
designed to have a punitive impact upon the corporation, corporate probation, and/or 
restraint immobalisation, ceasing trade or be deregistered.224 Since sentencing is a 
matter at the discretion of the court, there is no legal barrier to a South African court 
invoking one of the aforementioned sanctions.225  
 
3. CHILD LABOUR 
 
The Constitution has a section specifically recognising the rights of children.226 This 
provision holds that every child has the right to be protected from exploitative labour 
practices227 and not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services 
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that are inappropriate for the age of the child, or put the child’s well-being, education, 
physical or mental health, or spiritual, moral or social development at risk.228 Section 
28(2) provides that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every 
matter concerning the child. This provision mirrors the international and regional law 
concerning children provisions as discussed in the previous chapter. This provision is 
also similarly reflected in the Children ‘s Act.229  
 The definition section of the Children’s Act states that abuse in relation to a 
child means any form of harm or ill-treatment deliberately inflicted on a child, which 
includes, amongst others, a labour practice that exploits a child.230 It further states 
child labour as ‘work by a child which – (a) is exploitative, hazardous or otherwise 
inappropriate for a person of that age; and (b) places at risk the child’s well-being, 
education, physical or mental health, or spiritual, moral, emotional or social 
development.’ Any MNC employing children in such a manner is guilty of 
contravening the Children’s Act. Section 141 deals with the instance of child labour 
and exploitation of children. Any person (including juristic person) who uses, 
procures or employs a child for child labour (or in contravention of the BCEA) must 
be reported to the Department of Labour by a social worker or social service 
professional who becomes aware of such contraventions.231 Section 150(2) of the Act 
also identifies a child who is victim of child labour as a child who may be in need of 
care and protection. Such a circumstance must be referred for an investigation by a 
social worker.  
 Chapter six of the BCEA focuses on the prohibition of child labour. The Act 
states that no child under the age of 15 or who is under the minimum school-leaving 
age may be employed. Anyone is contravention of such provision and child labour (as 
defined by the Children’s Act – mentioned above) is guilty of an offence.232 It is 
further an offence to assist an employer to employ a child in contravention of the 
BCEA and discriminate against a person who refuses to be employed in contravention 
of the Act.233 MNCs employing children under the age of 15 are committing a 
criminal offence and may be dealt with under the normal criminal justice process.  
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 The enforcement mechanisms of the BCEA are found in chapter 10 of the Act. 
Labour inspectors, appointed by the Minister of Labour, are tasked to promote, 
monitor and enforce compliance with South African Labour law by advising 
employers and employees on their rights and obligations, conducting inspections, 
investigating complaints, endeavouring to secure compliance with labour law.234 
These inspectors have power of entry (to the workplace)235 and powers to question 
and inspect.236 Any inspector that has reasonable grounds to believe that an employer 
is not acting in compliance with the Act, he or she must attempt to secure a written 
undertaking from the employer to rectify his actions. The labour inspector may also 
issue a compliance order against an employer he believes, on reasonable grounds, has 
not being complying with a provision of the Act.237 A compliance order may also be 
made an order of the labour court on application by the Director-General of 
Labour.238  
 The Department of Labour developed a Child Labour Programme of Action 
for South Africa239 in order to eliminate child labour, which affects an estimated one 
million children in South Africa. The aims of the CLPA include promoting new 
legislative measures against the worst forms of child labour, strengthening national 
capacity to enforce legislative measures and increasing public awareness and social 
mobilisation against the worst forms of child labour.  
 
4. MNCS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
Section 24 of the Constitution provides the following: 
  
Everyone has the right 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
 (b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that- 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
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(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development 
 
Due to s 8(2) of the Constitution, and the fact that many non-state actors, including 
MNCs, undertake activities that may detrimentally affect the environment, it is argued 
that this section applies both vertically (i.e. it binds the state) but also horizontally 
(i.e. it binds natural and juristic persons).240   
 Various Acts of Parliament have been enacted to give realisation to the 
aforementioned constitutional right as is required by s 24 which states that 
environmental protection must occur through reasonable legislative and other 
measures. The court in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,241 
when interpreting another socio-economic right (the right to housing) indicated that 
reasonable legislative measures were not itself sufficient and that the state has an 
obligation to devise a programme to address the right in question that was reasonable 
in both conception and implementation.242 That programme must be a widespread one 
that coordinates efforts amongst all three branches of government and must be 
balanced and flexible. A reasonable programme must balance short, medium and 
long-term needs. 243  This reasoning should also apply to interpretation of the 
environmental right. The enacting of ‘reasonable legislation and other measures’ is 
not enough if the implementation aspect is lacking.    
The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA),244 National Water 
Act (NWA),245 and the Environmental Conservations Act,246 and the Minerals and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act247 are the main legislation enacted to give 
effect to s 24 of the Constitution. This section will discuss NEMA is more detail, 
before discussing the MPRDA. The next chapter will be focusing on the human rights 
violations committed by mining companies in South Africa.  
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4.1.National Environmental Management Act 
 
In terms of NEMA, ‘every person [(including juristic person248)] who causes, has 
caused or may cause significant pollution or degradation of the environment must 
take reasonable measures to prevent such pollution or degradation from occurring, 
continuing or recurring or, in so far as such harm to the environment is authorised by 
law or cannot be reasonably avoided or stopped, to minimise and rectify such 
pollution or degradation of the environment.’249 The persons on whom the above duty 
is imposed, include the owner of the land or premises, a person in control or has a 
right to use the land or premises on or in which any activity is or was performed or if 
any other situation exists which could or did cause pollution environmental 
degradation.250 Therefore, if an MNC has been granted permission by appropriate 
authorities to undertake various activities on South African land or premises, in terms 
of s 28(1) and (2) of NEMA, they will have the aforementioned obligation imposed 
upon them. The measures as referred to in s 28(1) may include measures to: 
 
(a) investigate, assess and evaluate the impact on the environment:  
(b) inform and educate employees about the environmental risks of their work and the 
manner in which their tasks must be performed in order to avoid causing significant 
pollution or degradation of the environment:  
(c) cease, modify or control any act, activity or process causing the pollution or 
degradation; (d) contain or prevent the movement of pollutants or the causant of 
degradation:  
(e) eliminate any source of the pollution or degradation: or  
(f) remedy the effects of the pollution or degradation.251  
 
Any person upon whom this duty is imposed by be directed to take any necessary and 
reasonable measures, if they have failed to do so on their own, by the Director-
General of Environmental Affairs and Tourism or provincial head of department,  in 
terms of s 28(4) of NEMA. The Director-General may take measures to remedy a 
situation should the obligated person fail to comply with a directive under s 28(4).252 
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The Director-General may recover any costs from the person who directly or 
indirectly contributed to the pollution or degradation, the owner of the land at the time 
when the pollution occurred, the person in control of the land or had the right to use 
such land, or any person that negligently failed to prevent the activity from being 
undertaken or the situation from coming about.253 Section 32 of NEMA deals with 
who has locus standi to enforce environmental laws. The Act states that any person, 
or group thereof, may seek appropriate relief in respect of any breach or threatened 
breach of any provision of NEMA, or any other statutory provision concerned with 
the protection of the environment or use of natural resources  - in that person’s 
interests, on behalf of another who is unable to institute proceedings, in interests of a 
class of persons whose interests are affected, in the public interest or in the interest of 
protecting the environment.254 This is a broad approach as concerns legal standing in 
NEMA, which is in line with the enforcement of rights provision (s 38) in the 
Constitution. NEMA, as mentioned, is the legislation that is intended to realise the 
environmental rights afforded to everyone in South Africa by the Constitution, 
therefore, it is only apt where the Act provides measures to enforce its provisions that 
legal standing should adopt the broad approach as provided for by the Constitution.255 
This broad approach to standing as provided by NEMA serves to increase access to 
justice, which is a constitutional right that everyone is entitled to.  
 In the case of Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Pelts Products and Others 256 , the applicant (owner of immovable property in 
industrial area of Port Elizabeth (PE)) sought an order investigating, evaluating, and 
assessing the impact of noxious gases emitted from the first respondent’s tannery in to 
the atmosphere of the surrounding area which resulted in corrosion of metal structures 
and equipment on the applicant’s property as well as the foul odour in the form of 
hydrogen sulphide. It was argued that the actions of the first respondent constituted a 
nuisance under the common law. In addition the noxious gases had a prejudicial effect 
on the health and well being of those on its premises as well as the inhabitants of 
                                                
253 Ibid, s 28(8). 
254 Ibid, s 32 (1). 
255 Constitution, s 38. In Ferreira and Levin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) para 165, President Chaskalson 
held that, for constitutional issues, that a broader approach to standing must be adopted. He held that 
this would be consistent with the mandate to uphold the Constitution and would serve to ensure that 
constitutional rights enjoy full measure of protection to which they are entitled. 
256 2004 (2) SA 393 (E).  
  
46 
PE.257 The applicant mainly relied on, however, s 28 of NEMA. In considering the 
application, the court had to consider what was ‘significant’ in that any person who 
caused significant pollution or degradation of the environment is caught under the net 
case by s 28(1) of NEMA.258 The court held that the assessment of significant 
involves a considerable amount of subjectivity. The court was satisfied that that the 
first respondent had breached the duty imposed upon it by s 28(1) and thus the 
applicant was entitled to an order, in terms of s 28(12) directing the Director-General 
(second respondent) or the provincial head of the department of environmental affairs 
(fourth respondent) to investigate, evaluate and assess the impact of the specific 
activities.259 The court also held that the causes and consequences of pollution are 
scientific matters. Therefore, when one is intending to take a decision of whether on 
whether to cease operations of the application – such a decision must be informed by 
scientific evidence, which was not provided for in the application.260   
 Section 33 of NEMA allows for private prosecution. Any person in the public 
interest or in the interest of protecting the environment may conduct a prosecution in 
respect of any breach, or threat thereof, of duty as recognised by NEMA. Such 
prosecution must be done in terms on the Criminal Procedure Act.261  
 Schedule 3 of NEMA lists provisions of various environmental legislation that 
would constitute a criminal offence should any of such provisions be breached. Any 
person convicted of any offence as listed in schedule 3 may be ordered by a court to 
pay the costs incurred by the organ of state who rehabilitated the environment 
damaged by the accused person.262 Section 35(5) – (9) of NEMA is of particular 
importance to the accountability of MNCs for pollution and environmental 
degradation as it applies to managers and employees or does or does not do an act 
which he was task to do or not do on behalf of his employer which would constitute 
an offence in terms of the Act. In such an event that the act or omission occurred 
because the employer failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent the act or omission 
from occurring, the employer shall be guilty of such an offence. The employer shall, 
therefore, be liable to be convicted and sentenced in respect to the offence committed. 
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Section 35(7) and (8) provide for liability of a director of a firm263, shall be guilty of 
an offence listed in schedule 3 if that offence resulted from the failure of the director 
to take all reasonable measures that were necessary under the circumstances to 
prevent the commission of such offence.  
 Corporations, especially those who are in the mining sector, are urged by 
NEMA to develop an environmental impact assessment and an environmental 
management plan after consultation with local communities.264 
 
4.2. Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
 
The activities undertaken by mining corporations have potential to severely degrade 
the environment and therefore it is important that the Legislation regulating the 
mining industry address this. The MPRDA encourages mining companies to develop 
social and labour plans (in consultation with local communities) and to submit reports 
on their progress the Departments of Minerals and Energy.265 An important objective 
of this Act is to ‘give effect to s 24 of the Constitution by ensuring that the country’s 
mineral and petroleum resources are developed into an orderly and ecologically 
sustainable while promoting justifiable social and economic development’.266 In terms 
of s 37(1) of the MPRDA, the principles set in s 2 of NEMA applies to all mining 
operations and serve as guidelines for interpretation, administration and 
implementation of the environmental requirements of the MPRDA.  
   
5. CONCLUSION 
 
South African presents a potentially robust legal framework that may be used to 
prohibit MNCs from committing human rights violations in the country. The 
Constitution  applies to the private actor as explained above and  creates rights and 
corresponding obligations for and on everyone in South Africa – not just South 
African citizens unless where specifically stated. Therefore, it may apply to MNCs 
operating in South Africa as well. Among other things, the Constitution recognises a 
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wide range of rights, including the right of children to protection from economic 
exploitation and the right of all South Africans to a healthy environment.  
 The Constitution also provides that when interpreting provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, the courts must consider international law. Furthermore, it states that the 
customary international law is binding on the country unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution.267 Therefore, the country is bound by all the customary international law 
as discussed in the previous chapter.  
 This chapter has also discussed the possibility of invoking criminal corporate 
liability to hold MNCs which have committed human rights violations accountable. 
Criminal sanctions could act as a strong deterrent against corporate human rights 
violations.  
 The mechanisms of holding MNCs accountable seem to be strong in South 
African Law. Criminal sanctions may be used where MNCs have employed children 
in Contravention of the Children’s Act and the BCEA, or for violating  certain 
provisions listed in schedule 3 of NEMA. Whether these mechanisms are used in 

















                                                




Human Rights Violations in the Extractive Industry in South Africa and the 




The objective of this chapter is to examine how South Africa has addressed the issue 
of MNCs committing human rights violations and how the country has taken steps to 
prevent such violations in practice. This chapter will pay particular attention to human 
rights violations in the extractive/ mining industry in South Africa. The mining 
industry is a distinctively large industry in South Africa due to the country’s vast 
number of mineral resources. South Africa is recognised as one of the world’s largest 
producers of gold, platinum and chromium and is the fourth largest producer of 
diamonds.268 The mining industry is vital contributor to the country’s GDP. These 
resources have attracted a great number of corporations with the goal of extracting 
resources for the sake of profit making. In the undertaking of their activities they, 
intentionally or unintentionally, created the potential for human rights abuses in the 
various South African communities in which they operate.  
Common problems associated with the extractive industry include depletion of non-
renewable resources and environmental impacts as result of air emissions, discharges 
of liquid effluents and generation of large volumes of solid waste.269 Extraction 
activities have a visual impact on the environment and lead to degradation and 
disturbance of natural habitats, and sometimes resulting in the loss of biodiversity.270 
In certain mining industries effluents may contain a large amount of toxic substances, 
such as cyanides and heavy metals, which can pose significant human health 
problems and ecological risks. 271  These problems presented themselves in the 
incidences of the tailing dams’ failures at the Baia Mare goldmine in Romania and at 
the Aznalcollar zinc, lead and copper mine in Spain.272 Once the mine and production 
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thereon has come to an end, a further risk of water contamination due to acid mine 
drainage, loss of biodiversity loss of land and visual impact is likely.273  
Mining corporations do not only pose environmental risks but they also pose social 
risks. These issues relate to the employees of the corporations as well as to society at 
large. 274 The mining industry poses above-average accident risks to employees and 
underground mines have highest incidences of fatalities, with the gold mining 
industry suffering the highest average fatality ratio.275 Some mining activities can also 
pose health and safety risks to local communities. Health risks can occur as result of 
air pollution caused by the mining, as well as accidental release of toxic substances 
into the atmosphere.276 Mining corporations have often being accused of violating 
human rights, in actions taken either independently or in collusion with the 
government. A few of these violations include paying unfairly low wages, denying 
employees the right to organise in trade unions, the use of child labour, abuse of 
women, forced labour and so on.277 All these matters are serious issues within the 
industry across the globe and thus have garnered significant attention from national 
and international communities as has been shown in the previous two chapters.  
As mentioned in the previous chapters the international and regional 
instruments, whilst binding on state parties, lack direct enforcement mechanisms on 
that of MNCs. Consequently, the countries in which the MNCs operate bear the duty 
of protecting human rights and ensuring that MNCs operating under its jurisdiction 
comply with the states human rights laws. This chapter will examine the extent to 
which South Africa ensures that MNCs respect and promote human rights. In doing 
so, this chapter will provide an overview of human rights violations that MNCs 
commonly commit and have the potential of committing in the country. Thereafter, 
the manner in which South Africa has addressed such violations as well as how they 
have attempted to deter further violations will be discussed and critiqued.  
 
2. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN 
SOUTH AFRICA  
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In order to fully explain the human rights violations committed by the 
mining/extractive industry in South Africa it is useful to first explain the structure of 
the industry.  
The mining industry can be divided into two phases: the first is the exploration 
phase and the second is the development or extraction phase.278 Extraction can be 
done either on the surface through an open pit or cast or underground. The method 
used for extraction is dependent on the size, shape and depth of the ore body because 
‘all operations involve the basic steps of ore breaking, loading and hauling to a mill 
for treatment’.279 At the end of this exploitation process, decommissioning and 
closing of the mines occurs. The main stakeholders in extractive industries are 
corporations, government agencies, civil society organisations and the local 
communities.280  
It is not infrequent that mining companies in South Africa disregard human 
rights. In the exploration and development phases, the local communities living on 
prospective mining sites are, more often than not, not provided the opportunity to 
participate meaningfully in decisions affecting their lives.281 Communities are often 
forced to relocate due to mining activities and therefore it is important that a 
consultation process with stakeholders is organised in a meaningful and sufficient 
manner.282 In a study undertaken by Eugene Cairncross and Sophia Kisting on 
Platinum Gold Mining in South Africa, participants therein stated that they were 
victims of forced last minute mining relocations to barren sites and facilities by 
Mining.283  In addition it was stated that the mine (Lonmin Mines – to be discussed in 
more detail in the next section), provides inferior housing, inadequate plumbing and 
no electricity as well as poor sewage systems and no refuse removal.284 However, it is 
argued that this public participation of local communities process is often deficient in 
that companies, government officials and legal advisors are secretive and do not 
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disclose relevant information to the affected people.285 In addition, the extraction 
phase if mining also harms the environment. The extraction of the mineral destroys or 
modifies the landscape as result of erosion during the extraction.286  
In a study of the Lonmin mines, it has been reported that the mining company 
has been discharging colourless gas sulphur dioxide at a level that exceeded the 
acceptable limit. 287  In addition, Lonmin mines have been denying the local 
communities their human right to water. This has occurred because mining is a water-
intensive activity – and Lonmin mines have been using the water resources 
extensively as Lonmin has identified their inability to acquire an adequate supply of 
water for their operations and the loss of sustainable water for their operations and 
communities as one of its major challenges.288 The local community is living in 
poverty due to the mining operations. The safety of the families including children is 
put at risk. The mining company has taken over their land and subjected them to 
various risks all in the name of maximising profits.  
 
3. SOUTH AFRICA’S EFFORTS TO ADDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 
 
This section will now demonstrate how South Africa has been able to prevent the 
potential violations of human rights and environmental degradation in practice. In 
doing so, this section will analyse the manner in which Coal for Africa (Pty) Ltd, an 
Australian registered company, has had its mining undertakings haltered for fear of 
harming the environment. Thereafter, a South African Human Rights Commission 
Investigation into the Anglo Platinum mining corporation’s relocation of a local 
community in the Limpopo province will be discussed. In addition, two criminal law 
cases will be examined in relation to environmental protection and how they will act 
as a deterrent for MNCs in the country.  
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3.1. Administrative Justice Mechanisms 
 
In 2009, a mining project located near Musina in Limpopo, has caused an outcry 
among surrounding landowner and local community as they felt the project to be 
undertaken by an Australian registered corporation, Coal of Africa Ltd will 
detrimentally affect the area.289 This was particularly worrying since the mine would 
be near to the Mapungubwe World Heritage Site and a number of game farms 
catering for tourists.290 These concerns emerged at a public participation meeting held 
in April 2009 before the completion of the environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
and environmental management plan (EMP), needed as part of the application process 
for a mining licence from the Department of Mining as well as the other relevant 
governmental department Water and Environmental Affairs. 291  Jacana 
Environmentals managed these particular EIA and EMP processes, in partnership 
with Naledi Development Restructured.292 Coal For Africa was granted an amended 
environmental authorisation in terms of s 24G NEMA in 2011. In 2015 Coal for 
Africa was granted amended environmental authorisation. This authorisation was 
challenged by way of appeal to the Minister of Environment. The appeal however 
failed on grounds that the amendment would not pose any additional impacts to those 
considered originally in 2011.293   
 In 2014 the Northern Gauteng High Court granted an interim interdict to local 
farmers, community and the Vhembe Mineral Resources Forum against in order to 
halt Coal for Africa’s mining at Makhado, Limpopo.294 In an application to have this 
interdict set aside in December 2015, the judgment had been reserved and the matter 
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postponed to consider the various arguments made.295 In 2016, the same mining 
company was granted an integrated water use licence for the Makhado coking and 
thermal coal project by the Department of Water and Sanitation.296 This decision was 
successfully challenged by farmers, the concerned local community and the Vhembe 
Mineral Resource Project to the same Department on grounds that the activities of the 
mine will permanently damage the environment their surrounding area which resulted 
in the Coal For Africa’s water use license being suspended.297 The company was due 
to start mining in the second half of 2016 and was intended to produce about 5.5 
million tonnes of coal per year for domestic and export markets.298 In terms of 
148(2)(b) of the South African National Water Act299 the appeal automatically 
suspends the integrated water use license. The decision the governmental department 
was commended by civil society as a good start in the step towards protection the 
environment.300 This successful appeal showcases the power that the local community 
can exert on mining corporations especially where the actions of such corporations 
may threaten the environment of the area. The mining project has the potential of 
causing irreversible damage to the area that includes the Mapungubwe Cultural 
Landscape, a World Heritage Site.301   
 This success, albeit temporary as the Australian mining corporation is in 
process of challenging the decision of the appeal, demonstrates that civil society 
together with the local community may utilise options provided to them in terms of 
South African Legislation, such as the National Water Act, in order to protect their 
environment and livelihoods from potentially destructive mining.  
 In recent years in South Africa, there has been stricter enforcement of the 
nation’s environmental laws, which are likely to see company directors place a greater 
emphasis on the company’s environmental management systems and result in 
improved environmental monitoring and compliance.  
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3.2. South African Human Rights Commission 
 
Anglo Platinum is another huge Mining Corporation operating in South Africa. In 
March 2008 a NGO, ActionAid called on the South African Human Rights 
Commission302 to conduct a full investigation into a series of of human rights 
violations made against the relocation process undertaken by the mining company at 
its min near Mokopane in the province of Limpopo.303 ActionAid’s report alleged that 
there were insufficient community representation mechanisms in the relocation 
process, inadequate clean water and sanitation services, environmental impacts and 
pollution caused by the Mogalakwena mine operated by Anglo Platinum.304 The 
SAHRC launched the report of their seven-month investigation. While the report did 
not find that Anglo Platinum had violated human rights, it did conclude that the local 
community was adversely affected by the relocation process conducted by Anglo 
Platinum and as result the report included a long-list of recommendations that could 
improve the relocation process as well as improve corporate social responsibility in 
general.305 Recommendations from the SAHRC include recommendations relating to 
the provisions of clean water and sanitation, environmental protection, provision of 
electricity, grave removals, and agricultural land and food security, compensation for 
any damage and/or loss and transportation of children to school.306 The SAHRC 
encouraged engagement between Anglo Platinum and the Mogalakwena Municipality 
in order to ensure these improvements. In addition, the SAHRC encouraged Anglo 
Platinum is develop its public participation mechanisms and to keep the affected 
people abreast on all stages of the development process.307 It was also recommended 
that Anglo Platinum should constantly monitor the environmental impacts of their 
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mining activities on surrounding communities and where their activities have 
negatively impacted of the mine, it must be addressed promptly.308 Anglo Platinum’s 
initial response to the report of the SAHRC investigation was defensive and critical. It 
was suggested that the SAHRC expected to high of a responsibility of the company 
for provisions that ought to be provided by the government.309 Anglo Platinum, 
however, later changed their tone and appeared to take a conciliatory stance on the 
report.310 ActionAid, while not being vindicated on their allegations that Anglo 
Platinum violated the human rights of the community within the Mogalakwena area, 
was satisfied with the results of the report.311 While the SAHRC is a good option for 
NGOs and other interested parties to submit a compliant of human rights violations 
and to bring awareness of human rights violations where they occur, the decisions 
made by the SAHRC are not directly binding on private or public actors. The SAHRC 
would not be able to institute enforcement mechanisms against Anglo Platinum 




There have also been occasions where the criminal justice system has been used to 
tighten the noose when it comes to ensuring that MNCs comply with human rights 
norms in South Africa. In the criminal case of S v Frylinck,312 for example, an 
environmental assessment practitioner (hereafter EAP) was held criminally liable for 
providing incorrect and misleading information in a basic impact assessment report to 
the Department of Environmental Affairs (hereafter DEA). Frylinck was employed by 
Mpofu Environmental Solutions CC and was employed by the Department of Public 
works to conduct an impact assessment report for development of the Pan African 
Parliament Buildings. The EIA regulations 313  stipulate that any EAP must be 
independent, and declare such independence under oath, and further provide that the 
furnishing of any incorrect or misleading information in the EIA is a criminal 
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offence.314 In his basic assessment report, Frylinck indicated that there was no 
wetland within a 500m radius of the proposed development site and therefore 
informed the relevant party within the DEA that a wetland delineation study was not 
necessary. However, once construction commenced, concerns were raised by 
governmental departments regarding the existence of a wetland.315 This presence was 
confirmed after an investigation was undertaken.  Frylinck was, thereafter, charged 
with fraud and contravention of regulation 81 of the 2006 EIA Regulations under 
NEMA. He was convicted on the charge of contravening reg 81.316 The court held 
that Frylinck conduct proved to be wilful disregard of the required standard by an 
EAP and that the EAP was negligent. 317  The EAP had provided incorrect or 
misleading information to the DEA. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment or a 
fine of R80000 and his firm was sentenced to a fine of R80000 with half the fines 
being suspended for five years.318 While this judgment doesn’t relate directly to 
mining MNCs, it is relevant here because MNCs, particularly mining corporation, 
require EIAs and therefore the appointment of EAPs in order to be granted relevant 
environmental authority and licences in order to undergo their various activities. This 
judgment highlights the importance of the role of EAPs in the EIA process and the 
need to ensure that accurate information is presented to the appropriate person. This 
judgment will go someway in reducing instances of corruption in order to gain licence 
in that this judgment will act as a strong deterrent for EAPs.  
Following the conviction of Frylinck the National Prosecuting Authority 
(hereafter NPA) went a step further and focused on attempting to hold company 
directors personally and criminally liable for environmental degradation that was 
caused on their watch. In 2012, the Ermelo Regional Court was the first court to 
invoke the criminal provisions of NEMA, the National Water Act and the 
environmental provisions in the MPRDA, against the managing director of a mining 
company and to convict him of contravening the relevant provisions of these 
Legislations. The charges arose from certain mining activities that impacted 
negatively on water resources in the area, including diversion of water resources, 
mining within a flood line, the failure to have pollution management on site, the 
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dumping of waste rock materials into a water resource and mining within a 
wetland. 319  The mining company was ordered to rehabilitate the damaged 
environment and the managing director was handed a five year prison sentence 
without the option of fine.320  
 More recently the Lenyenye Regional magistrate’s court in Limpopo in a land 
mark judgment, S v Blue Platinum ventures (Pty) Ltd and Matome Samuel 
Maponya321, reflected the direction that South African courts will take when it comes 
to ensuring compliance with environmental law. The facts of the case are as follows: 
Blue Platinum Ventures had undertaken clay-mining activities outside the village of 
Batlhabine in Limpopo since 2007, which resulted in serious environmental damage. 
This resulted in numerous complaints by the local community to the Department of 
Mineral Resources, which never resulted in any action taken against the mining 
company. The activities continued unchallenged until the community laid criminal 
charges against the company and its managing director Matome Maponya, in terms of 
NEMA.322 Maponya was convicted and sentenced to five years imprisonment, which 
was suspended on condition that the affected areas were rehabilitated within three 
months of the date of judgment.323 When the matter was brought to the North Gauteng 
High Court on automatic review, it was questioned as to why the magistrate had not 
convicted Blue Platinum Ventures on their plea of guilty – the issue was reverted 
back to the Magistrates Court so the magistrate could make an order on the issue.324 
The hope is that this judgment will result in MNCs and their directors paying 
considerably more attention to the conduct of their employees and the risk of harm to 
the environment caused by their activities.325 It is likely also to result in company 
directors placing more emphasis on having environmental management systems in 
place and ensuring that these systems are strictly monitored and enforced.326 This case 
sets a significant precedent for future prosecutions and may empower affected 
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communities to lay criminal charges against offending mining corporations and their 
directors for environmental damage and other human rights abuses. While the 
judgment in this case is positive, the NPA did target a relatively small corporation in 
the mining industry in comparison to the more major MNCs that are operating in the 
country. The hope is that the NPA will act against bigger corporations guilty of 
similar actions with the same amount of effort and vigour.327  
 While these judgments presents the lengths that the South African judiciary 
and prosecuting authority is willing to go to ensure environmental compliance as well 
as the protecting of human rights from mining corporations – South African courts 
and their staff have significant capacity constraints as well as lack of experience and 
training in the prosecution amongst prosecutors and magistrates in the area of 




This chapter has presented the manner in which mining corporations have the 
potential and are committing human rights violations especially when it comes to 
environmental degradation. The activities of mining corporations frequently damages 
and destroys landscapes, causes noise, air and water pollution and negatively affects 
the local community in which the mines operates. For these reasons, mining MNCs 
require various licences in terms of South African environmental and mining law and 
in applying for these licences all affected parties have the right to be heard and voice 
their concerns regarding mining in there community.  
 This chapter has further shown that where MNCs have been granted various 
permissions to disturb the environment, the local community has the right to appeal 
the granting of such permissions thus placing a moratorium on mining activities. The 
local community as well as civil society with an interest in protecting the environment 
have proven to be an effective weapon in curbing the damage that MNCs cause to the 
environment.  
 Furthermore, this chapter has shown that where company directors and 
company show willful disregard of how their actions are harming the environment 
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that it may be held criminally liable for the actions and face prison time. Furthermore, 
a recent judgment which held an EAP criminally liable when he provided incorrect 
and misleading information to the relevant officer regarding the results in the required 
EIA in terms of NEMA thus likely to result in a decrease in corruption amongst EAPS 
and MNCs.   
 However, the lack of experience and knowledge of prosecutors and 
magistrates in the area of environmental law can pose an obstacle in further and more 
complicated cases. Training therefore would be encouraged in this regard. 
 In addition, the NPA has so far, primarily only targeted ‘small’ mining 
corporations for prosecution of human rights violations. It may be unlikely that the 


































The previous chapters have attempted to show where international, regional and 
South African National law has failed and succeeded in holding MNCs accountable 
for human rights violations. This chapter will attempt to provide solutions to fill the 
gap left by the laws as discussed the previous chapters.   
 While South Africa, the country at the focus of this thesis, has various 
measures available to prevent MNCs from violating the human rights of its citizens 
and there are enforcement mechanisms available in various areas of South African 
law to hold them accountable, there is room for further improvement of South African 
law on the issue. 
 Recommendations as so far South African law is concerned will be discussed, 
specifically with regard to the development of the applicability of the Constitution on 
corporations as well as the notion of state responsibility.  
 
2. DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL LAW 
 
South African law provides various options to protect its citizens from the activities of 
MNCs operating in the country. This section will recommend solutions that may 
assist in further accountability of MNCs where they have violated human rights as 
well as ensuring the state takes stricter measures in order to prevent such violations 
from occurring in the first place.  
 
2.1. Notion of State Responsibility 
 
Chapter 2 discussed the notion of state responsibility and the duty to protect in 
international and African regional law. This duty has been recognised to some extent 
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in South African law, but has not been used in relation to prevention of human rights 
violations by MNCs.  
The SERAC case discussed in chapter 2 above held the Nigerian state 
accountable for failing in its duty to protect its citizens from human rights violations 
committed by an MNC operating within the country. This duty to protect is 
recognised in South Africa329, there has, however, been no extension of this duty to 
protect specifically where state have failed to prevent MNCs from violating human 
rights as well as holding MNCs accountable where they have done so. The SERAC 
case was determined in terms of the African Charter. South Africa has signed and 
ratified the Charter. However, s 231(4) of the Constitution states that an international 
agreement becomes law in South Africa only becomes law in the country when it is 
enacted into law by legislation. Section 39(2) of the Constitution does, however, state 
that when a court is interpreting a provision of the Bill of Rights international law 
must be considered. The SERAC matter will, therefore, hold some weight where a 
court has to decide on whether the South African state has the legal duty to protect its 
citizens from MNC activities and where they have failed in their duty (through the 
failure to regulate MNC activities, for example) they may be held liable.  
 The Constitutional Court has an obligation to develop the common law.330 
When the court decides whether or not to develop the common law, it must hold a 
two-stage inquiry. The first stage requires the court to consider whether the existing 
common law (having regard to s 39(2)) necessitates development in terms of the 
section.331 If this question is answered in the affirmative, the second stage is to 
determine how such development is to take place.332 Furthermore, the court stated that 
its power to develop the common law in such manner is not discretionary – but rather 
                                                
329 In the Constitutional Court case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (10) BCLR 
995 (CC) held that the state (police officers and prosecutors) had acted negligently where they failed in 
their legal duty to protect the appellant from a sexual assault by a perpetrator who had previously been 
arrested and convicted, on more that one occasion, of similar offences. The court held that where the 
 state failed to protect a woman from a particular man, who they knew had a violent nature, who they  
recommended be released from police custody on warning, while out on bail, the accused assaulted the  
appellant. This failure could amount in negligence thus giving a rise to a claim in delict.  
330 Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides as follows: 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights. 
331 Carmichele supra note 329 at [40]. 
332 Ibid.  
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an obligation.333 The law as regards this legal duty to protect of the state should be 
developed to include protection from human rights violations at the hand of MNCs. 
 Where an MNC is consistently violating human rights in South Africa and the 
appropriate South African authority has not done anything to stop such violations 
through their failure to hold such MNCs accountable, through failure to regulate 
MNC activities or through complicity or enabling of MNC human rights violations 
the state should be held liable in a similar nature to that of the Nigerian government in 
the SERAC case. 
 
2.2. Constitutional Applicability of MNCs 
 
Chapter 3 discussed the applicability of the South African Constitution to MNCs, 
stating that the direct horizontal application will only be possible in certain 
circumstances.334 The Constitutional Court case of Mankayi, discussed above briefly 
in chapter 3, highlighted an issue with the court’s hesitation to directly horizontally 
apply the Constitution to MNCs who have violated human rights of South African 
citizens – but holding that the appellant had a delictual claim against the company. 
The appellant, however, passed away before any such claim could be instituted, and 
as result thereof it did not contribute as much as it could to the development of human 
rights accountability of corporations.335  
 The debate amongst academics on the advantages of direct and indirect 
horizontal application is extensive, while it seems fair to conclude that the courts have 
preferred indirect horizontal application over direct.336 Furthermore, courts favour 
holding the state accountable where possible, thus moving away from horizontality 
and expressing preference for vertical application of the Constitution over corporation 
violations.337 This preference is in line with the traditional model that companies’ 
human rights compliance should only be voluntary, while states have duty to hold 
companies’ liable through law and regulation.338 If the appellant in the Mankayi 
matter had seen his action to the finish line, the judgment could have paved the way 
for the development an actions against companies in delict on a human rights basis. 
                                                
333 Ibid. 
334 Constitution, s 8(2).  
335 Smit op cit note 183 at 357. 





While the application of the Constitution would still have been indirect, the effect 
would be that a litigant could claim a company has a legal duty to protect their human 
rights – and that they have failed to do so – thus exposing them to a delictual claim.339 
The judiciary is placed to recognise the existence of such legal duty – and such the 
law should be developed to form the contents and limits of said duty. Examples of 
these contents and limitations would be: would it apply to all stakeholders, what 
would be the requirements for reasonableness, are there limitations to the amount of 
damages an infringed party could be awarded, does the duty extend to all rights, 
including civil and political as well as socio-economic rights. These are some of the 
questions that the court in Mankayi could have answered had the appellant not died 
before his delictual claim could be realised. South African courts, however, are likely 
to encounter matters of a similar nature involving corporations and it is recommended 
that the courts recognise the direct horizontal application of constitutional rights on 
corporations. Section 8(2) of the Constitution allows for such direct horizontal 
application where it is applicable, ‘taking into account the nature of the right and the 





To conclude, MNCs are in a position to cause massive violations of human rights if 
they are not adequately regulated either by international, regional and/or national law. 
The Union Carbide factory explosion in India, the BP Oil Spill in in Gulf of Mexico, 
and the environmental degradation caused by Shell Petroleum in Nigeria are only a 
few instances where MNCs have violated human and environmental rights in 
countries in which they are operating. It is, therefore, essential that mechanisms be 
put in place and, where they are in place, they should be effective in holding MNCs 
accountable where they have violated human rights and to prevent them from 
committing further violations.  
 South Africa has various mechanisms available to them to address MNC 
activities that could potentially violate human rights as well as harm the environment. 
They have addressed such activities through administrative law, criminal sanctions 
                                                
339 Ibid at 371. 
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through the investigating powers of the SAHRC to name a few. However, this thesis 
has recommended a few manners in which MNCs could be better held accountable for 
human rights violations.  
This chapter had recommended that the legal duty to protect or the notion of 
state responsibility recognised under international, African regional and South 
African law should be extended to that of human rights violations committed by 
MNCs in South Africa. This chapter has further argued that in the South African 
context, that the judiciary should set an important precedent regarding direct 
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